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Introduction
The dual nature of money, as a con-
crete and valued substance and, at the 
same time, as something that owes its 
significance to the complete dissolu-
tion of substance into motion and 
function, derives from the fact that 
money is the reification of exchange 
among people, the embodiment of a 
pure function. (Simmel 1990: 176) 
Georg Simmel 
To talk of the global economy today is to 
talk about movement. The rapid passage of 
capital between financial centres has led to 
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Prior to the deregulation of the Thatcher years, the City of London (London’s finan-
cial district) was largely self-regulated, operating via what Michael Moran refers 
to as ‘an explicit ideology of cooperative regulation’, institutionalized within a 
system of market-specific, club-like bodies, such as the Stock Exchange and Lloyds 
insurance market. Supervised and operated via its members, the components of 
each institution were tied together through a mode of exchange that prized face-
to-face contact, reputation and trust, epitomised by the Stock Exchange motto 
Dictum Meum Pactum (‘My word is my bond’). The latter was made concrete via 
messenger-operated payment and clearing systems, organised around the hours of 
trade, provoking the need for proximity between institutions and specific archi-
tectural arrangements and resulting in an urban agglomeration of banks and other 
institutions in the immediate vicinity of the Bank of England. 
 The advent of digital technology entailed a decline in the economic significance of 
pedestrian activity in the City. The shift from manual, paper operations to onscreen 
transactions made redundant the kinetic network of brokers and messengers that 
once formed the circulatory system for banking and finance. This paper considers 
the way in which such shifts ultimately reconfigured the nature of the street as 
public space and argues that, as fundamental parts of the financial transaction were 
removed from the City’s thoroughfares, the street would no longer be an extension 
of the workplace, but a space of leisure. Exploring concepts such as ‘transaction’, 
‘regulation’ and ‘exchange’ as social processes with material consequences, this 
paper attempts to chart the historical link between the street and economic activ-
ity, through analysis of the City’s myriad pedestrian ways and changing attitudes 
to planning public space in the fifty years following the Second World War.
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analyses of the economy as a ‘space of flows’ 
(Castells 1989), and a broader conceptualisa-
tion of capital as a kinetic force. In reality, the 
speed of digital technology means that trans-
actions today are not at all spatial or mobile. 
Financial markets consist of onscreen 
changes in title rights, rather than the physi-
cal act of exchange, and are reliant upon a 
host of legal agreements such as labour, debt 
and investment contracts and many more. 
The fiction of mobility provides a mode of 
diagramming this process, yet causes it to be 
abstracted from its material reality. 
The process of exchange continues to be 
dependent upon people and places. New 
financial centres are emerging all over the 
world in ever grander and more iconic 
forms, whilst old ones consolidate their pres-
ence with novel additions to their skylines. 
However, the advent of mobile technology 
and the expansion of the Internet in recent 
years have ensured that the material rela-
tionship between exchange and place is less 
obvious. Historically, the transaction was 
reliant upon the movement of people and 
paper in space (whether in the market, the 
square or the street) and was carried out in 
concrete places. Urban places could, there-
fore, be more readily understood as material 
components in the complex process of finan-
cial exchange, unlike the symbolic role the 
skyscraper has for the global economy today. 
Georg Simmel’s conception of money, as ‘the 
reification of the pure relationship between 
things as expressed in their economic 
motion’, seems an appropriate metaphor 
(Simmel 1990: 176). The financial centre, as a 
tangible object, has, like money, become the 
material symbol of the contractual relation-
ships between people ‘as expressed in their 
economic motion’. 
This paper explores the relationship 
between transaction and place through an 
analysis of the changing economic role of the 
street in the City of London in the fifty years 
following the Second World War. Unlike the 
exchange or marketplace, the street is a 
material element of economic activity that 
is often overlooked on account of its ‘in-
between’ position, despite playing a funda-
mental role in the financial community prior 
to the digitisation of trade. Furthermore, 
the connotations of movement associated 
with the street, the road and the pedestrian 
way in the financial context, go some way 
to explaining our contemporary fascination 
with economic ‘flows’. 
The following discussion considers the role 
of the street, alley and pedestrian way in the 
shifting context of financial practice via an 
analysis of the more mundane daily activi-
ties in the life of one of the world’s leading 
financial centres, the City of London (hereaf-
ter ‘the City’). The advent of digital technology 
entailed a decline in the economic significance 
of pedestrian activity in the City; the shift 
from manual, paper operations to onscreen 
transactions made redundant the kinetic net-
work of brokers, messengers and bankers that 
once formed the circulatory system of the 
City. This paper considers the way in which 
such shifts ultimately reconfigured the nature 
of the street as public space, arguing that, as 
fundamental parts of the financial transaction 
were removed from the City’s thoroughfares, 
the street would no longer be an extension of 
the workplace, but a space of leisure. 
Transactional channels
Owned and administered by an independ-
ent municipal authority known as the City of 
London Corporation, the City is a juridically 
distinct enclave within Greater London and 
the UK, physically contained to little more 
than a ‘Square Mile’. Officially ‘apolitical’, 
the relationship of the Corporation with the 
British government has been complex. The 
Corporation has existed since before Parlia-
ment, and is known for its host of ancient 
ceremonies and peculiar range of institu-
tions, such as the livery companies and its 
Lord Mayor. It is also the only political con-
stituency in the country in which businesses 
form the majority of the electorate – a prac-
tice that was outlawed elsewhere in Britain 
in the local government Act of 1963. It has 
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historically emphasized its right to inde-
pendence from the state, and today retains 
the only non-parliamentary representative 
allowed into the Commons Chamber: the 
Remembrancer, a lobbyist for the financial 
services industry, charged with protecting 
the City’s rights and privileges (City of Lon-
don Corporation n.d.).
As the former commercial heart of the 
British Empire, the City was a concentrated 
example of the networked society that had 
ensured the dispersal of privilege in Britain 
and in the colonies for centuries. Defined 
by its gentlemanly code of conduct, epito-
mised by the Stock Exchange motto ‘Dictum 
Meum Pactum’ (‘My word is my bond’), the 
dense web of specialist financial sectors 
that clustered within the boundary of the 
City were linked by functional and famil-
ial networks, assisting an informal method 
of self-regulated business practice that was 
unique to Britain. Michael Moran defines the 
latter as ‘an explicit ideology of cooperative 
regulation’, unique in its formalisation of its 
seemingly informal institutions into a collec-
tion of club-like establishments, such as the 
Stock Exchange, the Baltic Exchange and the 
Corporation of Lloyds, around which the City 
would operate (Moran 2003: 2).
Within the City, the components of this sys-
tem were linked through financial, social and 
spatial operations that necessitated proxim-
ity. For example, all Stock Exchange member 
firms were required to keep offices within 
seven hundred yards of the Exchange itself in 
order to take advantage of its centralised set-
tlement system (Thrift 1994: 343), whilst all 
of Lloyds’ member brokers were encouraged 
to base themselves in the immediate envi-
rons of the insurance market to facilitate the 
spread of information. Beyond the confines 
of the contained markets, there were also the 
exchanges occurring between institutions, 
most notably the banks, of which the clear-
ing banks, discount houses and merchant 
banks formed an important triumvirate geo-
graphically linked through Town Clearing 
(Courtney and Thompson 1996: xvii).
Unlike the digital clearing systems used 
by banks today, up until the late twentieth 
century, the settlement of accounts between 
two parties in the City was a physical act, car-
ried out via messengers and choreographed 
according to a precise timetable. The process 
was separated into three independent sys-
tems: General Clearing, 9.15–10.30am; Town 
Clearing, 2.30–3.45pm; and Cheque Clearing, 
a system initially dealing with the payment 
of salaries. All three were operated via the 
Bankers’ Clearing House, the institution at 
the heart of the clearing system, to which all 
cheques were sent for payment. Situated in 
the midst of the banking area on Lombard 
Street, the Clearing House remained empty 
for large periods of the day, standing in the 
form of a small classical building, seemingly 
incommensurate with the 2–3 million pay-
ments that would be processed there daily 
– the result of its time-specific functionality 
(Economists Advisory Group 1971: 282).
Town Clearing was the most important for 
institutions in the City as it was the only way 
of processing high-value same-day payments, 
and thus involved nearly every institution in 
the City. Town Clearing required its members 
to reside in the Town Clearing Area, namely 
the half-mile radius of the Bankers’ Clearing 
House, for reasons of expediency (Hailey and 
Wanley 1973).1 Operated by messengers who 
would bring the total number of cheques 
accrued by their bank to the Clearing House 
at the end of the day, the system dealt with 
high-value transactions that had a quick 
turnover time: a cheque between two town 
branches received at 3pm would be cleared 
the same day; consequently the speed and 
efficiency of the system was of vital impor-
tance to the money market (Economists 
Advisory Group 1971: 280). The result was 
a highly mechanised process, orchestrated 
by a computing army of female clerical staff 
who were trained to process a minimum of 
2,000 payments per hour and served by hun-
dreds of messengers moving rapidly through 
the City’s streets at specific times of the day 
(Battersby 1964). 
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Prior to the automation of clearing and 
settlement procedures, the labyrinthine web 
of alleys and cut-throughs within the Town 
Clearing Area formed an integral part of this 
transactional process. Their role as channels 
for capital had emerged from the activities 
of the merchants and traders of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth century, for whom 
the alleyways and courtyards surrounding 
the Bank, the Royal Exchange and Lombard 
Street comprised the circulatory system for 
the anatomy of finance and trade, permit-
ting face-to-face interaction and rapid com-
munication between the various commodity 
markets located in the coffee houses bur-
ied deep within the blocks. Despite some 
sizeable infrastructural developments and 
building booms in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, this tightly wound system 
of passages and precincts were for the most 
part retained to assist informal patterns of 
exchange as well as the settlement process 
that had grown in scale and complexity with 
the rise of Britain’s imperial earnings.
The physical and economic devastation 
caused by both World Wars in the first half 
of the twentieth century seemed to increase 
the importance of preserving and reinstat-
ing the City’s smaller streets to facilitate the 
rebuilding of markets. The latter was high-
lighted in post-war planning policy. William 
Holford and Charles Holden’s 1947 plan 
for rebuilding the City embraced the City’s 
‘private circulation’, proposing a network of 
pedestrian precincts connected by the exist-
ing alleyways and courtyards (Holden and 
Holford 1951: 231–264). ‘There is, of course, 
even a functional pattern in the ant-heap’, 
they argued, ‘the planner’s problem is to 
make this pattern more efficient’ (Holden 
and Holford 1951: 232). Efficiency was to be 
met with greater provision for pedestrians, 
including: ‘increased open space, generally 
in small patches’; the linking up of such 
areas with ‘shopping centres, historic build-
ings, and open viewpoints by means of wider 
pavements [...] or tree planted streets [...] or in 
some cases subways under traffic crossings’; 
the construction of shopping arcades in 
Leadenhall Market and Old Broad Street, ‘and 
in some of the sunk roundabouts [...] where 
small purchases can be made on the way to 
and from railway stations and during the 
lunch hour’; the closure of certain streets to 
all but service vehicles; and the widening of 
pavements (Holden and Holford 1951: 289).
The large-scale incendiary bombing during 
the Blitz had destroyed some 26.8 million 
sq ft (31%) of the 85.8 million sq ft of office 
space in the City (City of London Department 
of Architecture and Planning 1976), most 
of which the Holden and Holford proposal 
sought to rebuild.2 After the delivery of pub-
lic spaces, roads and infrastructure, the report 
calculated the required office floor space 
area to be approximately five times that of 
available building sites, and subsequently 
enforced the first plot ratio regulation of 5:1 
for all new developments, which was strictly 
implemented until it was abolished in 1994 
(Holden and Holford 1951: 301). Where the 
London Building Act had formerly placed 
restrictions on the height of a building, the 
new law placed limits on the total area of a 
given building in relation to its site. 
The high demand for office space within 
the Town Clearing Area was acknowledged 
in the report by increasing the plot ratio to 
5.5: 1 in the half-mile radius of the Bank of 
England (Holden and Holford 1951: 302). 
The lack of floor space in the area meant that 
office buildings were often buttressed up 
against each other, and consequently built 
with myriad passages running through and 
between them in order to allow access for 
those who worked deep within the block, 
and to conform to the new daylighting 
code as set out in the reconstruction policy. 
Acting as convenient short-cuts, these nar-
row, interlaced channels turned the mes-
sengers’ daily clearing walks into occasions 
for opportunist espionage, as they walked 
past offices, overhearing conversations and 
meeting other messengers on their daily 
rounds (Courtney and Thompson 1996: 
205). Similarly, for those who were known 
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by the gatekeepers, it was even possible to 
take a shortcut right through the Bank of 
England’s seemingly impenetrable fortress 
walls, from Bartholomew Lane to Princes’ 
Street (Hennessy 1992: 338).
The street as a mode of economic 
regulation
The manual clearing systems had helped to 
keep the City’s self-regulatory practices in 
place, reinforced by the Bank of England’s 
supervision. Acting as a porous barrier 
between Westminster and the Square Mile, 
the Bank and its workforce comprising many 
former City executives, had emerged during 
the nineteenth century as the central regula-
tor for the City due to its development into 
the central bank. As Michael Pryke notes, this 
regulation expanded into the physical realm 
of the Square Mile, as the City’s built form 
had effectively developed around the Bank of 
England, placing it at the core of a precisely 
orchestrated spatio-temporal system, revolv-
ing around the hours of trade, settlement and 
clearing times, and the changing Bank Rate 
(Pryke 1991: 204). This was enforced through 
the imposition of spatial rules to which all 
companies and institutions had to conform, 
the most important being the insistence on 
the close proximity of all banks to the Bank 
of England to facilitate supervision and its 
own centralised settlement system, which it 
operated in its capacity as the ‘banker’s bank’ 
(Pryke 1991: 204). 
The village-like social structure and iso-
lation of the financial core of the City had 
intensified in the post-war period, arguably 
in response to the increasing interference of 
the state in City affairs. The encroachment 
of the government – which had necessarily 
tightened its grip on the City following the 
collapse of the Gold Standard in 1931 and in 
the financially demanding years leading up 
to the Second World War – culminated in 
the nationalisation of the Bank of England 
in 1946. This transition reinforced the dual 
nature of the Bank as regulator of, and spokes-
person for, the City. Acting simultaneously as 
the City’s and the Government’s representa-
tive in each territory, the Bank was effectively 
‘an interface between the state and the mar-
ket’ (Burn 1999: 241).
The modus operandi in the City reflected 
the prevailing Keynesian approach to eco-
nomic policy of the post-war period: namely, 
that the most efficient way to stimulate eco-
nomic growth and curb inflation was by con-
trolling demand via the state. In theory, this 
could be done through two agents: central 
government, which would use taxes and pub-
lic spending to affect productivity; and the 
central bank – the Bank of England – which 
could control interest rates and therefore the 
supply of money in the system, acting as a 
kind of monetary pump. In addition to keep-
ing the accounts of the Exchequer and other 
government departments, and acting as a 
registrar for all quoted Government securi-
ties, the Bank was responsible for control-
ling the money supply via its activities in the 
money markets – namely, the discounting of 
commercial bills. The latter was executed via 
an intermediary agent known as the Discount 
Houses: if the Bank wanted to inject money 
into the market it would buy commercial 
bills from the Houses; if it wanted to drain 
money it would sell bills (Ferris 1960: 72).
The Discount House brokers were required 
to be extremely knowledgeable about the 
state of the market and, as such, they would 
spend the first part of the morning making 
the rounds on foot to relevant banks and 
institutions in the City, which on a good 
day could total in excess of 100 visits (Ferris 
1960: 62). Sociability was essential and the 
oral contract was sacrosanct, as most transac-
tions were not finalised on paper until the 
end of the day (Ferris 1960: 62–63). As the 
mediators between the Bank and the market, 
the Discount Houses were granted privileged 
access to the Bank’s fortress via the Discount 
Office, known in the City as ‘eyes and ears of 
the Bank’, or ‘the window in the windowless 
wall’ (Pryke 1991: 205; Kynaston 2000: 56). 
Each morning, the manager of each Discount 
House would visit the Discount Office to give 
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the Bank the general ‘feel’ of the market, so 
it knew how much money to pump into the 
system (via the minimum lending rate of 
Treasury Bills – effectively an equivalent of 
setting interest rates). The Bank would then 
communicate the decision to buy or sell via 
an individual known as the special buyer, or 
“hidden hand”’ (Ferris 1960: 72). The eco-
nomic purpose of this ritualistic process was 
to keep money in constant circulation and 
avoid the idleness of spare cash. Indirectly, 
the system also facilitated the territorial per-
sistence of tradition that had ensured the 
reproduction of the City’s impermeable cul-
ture for centuries. 
New markets, new solutions 
Within the next decade, an increased rational-
isation of economic modelling and financial 
practices began to break down the synergy 
between the City’s informal geography and 
its informal mode of transaction. A scientific 
overhaul of the mechanisms of the financial 
system took shape throughout the 1960s: 
the rise of ‘the analyst’ meant that banks 
were increasingly using statistics to assess 
the state of the market as opposed to the 
biographical information and reputation of 
companies, merchant banks moved beyond 
their purely advisory capacity to become 
specialists in takeovers and mergers, and the 
Stock Exchange introduced an examination 
for potential new brokers for the first time in 
its history. This process of rationalisation was 
a response to broader shifts that were taking 
place in the context of international finance, 
which would eventually eradicate the City’s 
territorial practices.
For the last two decades, Britain’s Keynesian 
approach to policy had been centred on pre-
serving currency stability. Maintaining the 
strength of Sterling was, of course, partly 
ideological as the Sterling Area – Britain’s 
empire-based currency zone – represented 
Britain’s last stronghold over its imperial 
dominion, which the Bank’s socio-spatial 
supervision in the City had helped to main-
tain. However, the 1960s saw the emergence 
of the Eurocurrency markets, London’s first 
offshore currency markets, as well as a new 
set of money markets in Local Authority 
Loans and Inter-bank lending that operated 
outside of these parameters. The new money 
markets dramatically altered the spatial oper-
ations of the City. The development of the 
Euromarket, followed by the emergence of 
a highly lucrative Eurobond market, resulted 
in a dramatic influx of international business, 
with the number of foreign banks in the City 
doubling from 77 in 1960 to 159 in 1970 
(Kynaston 2000: 501). The shortage of floor 
space in the historic core and the growth of 
firms forced companies to seek accommoda-
tion beyond the traditional heart of the Town 
Clearing Area (Kynaston 2011: 404).
In addition, the mode of exchange itself 
was beginning to change. For the first time, 
the Interbank markets permitted banks 
to lend unsecured (i.e. without the liquid-
ity to back up the deal), a concept that was 
seemingly anathema to the City’s Dictum 
Meum Pactum ethos, relying on the credit-
worthiness of the individual. The increas-
ingly abstract and speculative nature of 
these new financial instruments ensured 
that the quantity of transactions was much 
higher than the quantity of final payments 
made, thereby creating a distortion between 
the spatial act and the transactional process 
on account of the incompatibility of their 
relative speeds (Economists Advisory Group 
1971: 297).3 Initially, this increased speed 
was predominantly facilitated by telephone 
trading, which still necessitated proximity 
between institutions for the final settlement 
of accounts between parties, as well as unof-
ficial visits to the banks to assess the state 
of the market, and the Bank’s own mode of 
intervention through the discount houses. 
However, in line with the evermore scientific 
approach to financial practices, through-
out the 1960s there were efforts to begin 
to automate the paper system, a develop-
ment that was assisted by the passing of the 
Stock Transfer Act in 1963, ensuring that cer-
tificates no longer needed to have a buyer’s 
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name on a form, and thus eliminating the 
necessary individualisation of every transac-
tion (Kynaston 2000: 139).
The impulse behind automation was 
largely for reasons of economy and efficiency. 
By the end of the 1960s a number of finan-
cial institutions had invested in computers 
as a way to counteract the shortages of cleri-
cal labour, wage increases, and increasing 
space restrictions following the first build-
ing boom (Economists Advisory Group 1971: 
276). The innovations during the 1960s 
were predominantly process-driven, aim-
ing at reducing the costs caused by human 
processing speeds and the time spent cor-
recting errors and inaccuracies in the paper 
system (Smith 1970: 926). America and its 
financial centres provided the inspiration 
for many of these improvements, which had 
been at the forefront of computing solutions 
since producing the first digital computer 
in 1940 (Batiz-Lazo and Wood 2002: 9). The 
Bank had sent members of its Accountants 
Department over as early as 1955 to review 
‘business machine equipment’, and most 
computers acquired in the City throughout 
the 1960s were manufactured by American 
companies (Bank of England 1955; Batiz-
Lazo and Wood 2002: 9). 
The impetus for innovation in both New 
York and London was not so much the 
transaction time itself, but rather that every 
institution was obliged to know the precise 
location of each certificate, as well as the 
status of accounts, at any given moment. 
The latter was made increasingly difficult 
with the rise in the number of transactions 
that emerged with new and expanding mar-
kets, and the ever more complex methods 
of processing, which required each paper 
certificate to pass through a vast number of 
hands. As a commissioner of the Securities 
Exchange Commission in New York wrote 
in 1970, in the case of stock certificates 
alone, each piece of paper would go through 
around 14 different processes and over four 
‘street carries’ in the space of a few days, pass-
ing through ‘the branch office, the receiving 
department, the transfer analyst, the transfer 
department, the receiving department and 
the delivery department’ (Smith 1970: 926). 
Following this, the certificate would have to 
be packaged and sent to the transfer agent 
(where it would be handled by four differ-
ent people: the window clerk, transfer ana-
lyst, examiner and cage clerk), before going 
through the typing, proofing, balancing and 
sorting departments, after which it would be 
sent to the registrar to sign the certificate by 
hand. Following this, it would be sent back 
to the transfer agent and then back to the 
original brokerage house for it to be logged 
once more, and then sent to the receiving 
party (broker, bank or individual) if necessary 
(Smith 1970: 927).
While the City had its own idiosyncrasies, 
the journey of the stock certificate or other 
bill was similar in its geographical scope 
to that of New York, and with the number 
of articles cleared annually at the Bankers 
Clearing House rising from 397 million in 
1958 to 854 million in 1968, the system was 
becoming increasingly clogged and subject 
to error (Economists Advisory Group 1971: 
278). Solutions such as punch card systems 
and magnetic ink, and even the use of CCTV 
for document transmission, were intro-
duced to assist the centralisation of clearing 
systems by ‘netting’ balances against each 
other in electronic form and thereby limit-
ing the amount of paper moving around 
the City (Economists Advisory Group 1971: 
239). In 1960, the Stock Exchange settle-
ment department was mechanised, with 18 
machines installed to carry out the activi-
ties previously carried out by 150 workers, 
whilst the Bankers’ Clearing House acquired 
new cheque sorting machines to manage the 
increasing amounts of paper flooding in with 
the new markets (Progress and Tradition: 
Electronic Robots 1960). The latter required 
cheques to be in strict order and as such to 
be delivered in boxes, loaded into trollies and 
then transported by vans. Due to the lack of 
access to the Clearing House on its cramped 
Lombard Street site, special electric vehicles, 
Thomas: Money Walks | The Economic Role of the Street in 
the City of London 1947–1993
Art. 20, page 8 of 15
akin to small milk floats and designed to 
be quiet, were developed so as not to dis-
turb surrounding offices. At one point the 
street was even paved with rubber blocks 
to dampen the noise (Cheque and Credit 
Clearing Company n.d.; Economists Advisory 
Group 1971: 280). 
Despite advances in technology, the domi-
nance of pedestrian trading activity in the 
City prevailed until its digitisation in the 
1980s. However, much like attempts at 
financial automation, the City’s planning 
department, for the first time in its history, 
took steps to actively programme pedes-
trian activity in the City. In 1967 and 1969, 
two major surveys were conducted by the 
Corporation to calculate the movement of 
office-workers throughout the Square Mile.4 
The surveys represented a general mood in 
urban planning that viewed pedestrian free-
dom as the mark of a civilised city, and traffic 
as the enemy. The growth in car ownership 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s had given 
rise to an anxiety surrounding congestion 
and collision in the urban realm, as well 
as to a planning rhetoric that favoured the 
segregation of pedestrians and cars. At the 
regional level, this was implemented via 
decentralisation policies and the construc-
tion of satellite towns such as Croydon to 
stem the build-up of traffic in the city cen-
tre. At the urban scale, segregation was to be 
based on the Corbusian model, with plan-
ners such as Sir Colin Buchanan propagating 
the division of the city into raised pedestrian 
walkways with motorways below (Buchanan 
and Crowther 1963). It was from within this 
context that the Corporation momentar-
ily implemented a scheme, which, if com-
pleted, would have been the most radical 
infrastructural programme in the history 
of London ever to be built: the Pedway, a 
30-mile network of raised walkways cover-
ing the Square Mile.
Unsurprisingly, the concept of vertical seg-
regation in the City did not emerge from the 
Corporation’s conservative planning person-
nel (under the auspices of the City Engineer), 
but from the more radical London County 
Council (LCC) Architects’ Department 
(Hebbert 1993: 435, 440). Whilst most of 
the City’s planning decisions had been trans-
ferred back to the Corporation by 1955, 
after a brief spell in LCC hands during the 
post-war period, the scale of bombsites in 
Paternoster Square and the Barbican necessi-
tated a collaborative approach to redevelop-
ment between the two municipalities. These 
vacant sites presented themselves to the 
LCC as opportunities for experimentation 
with ‘three-dimensional planning’ via raised 
walkways (Hebbert 1993: 435). Although, as 
Michael Hebbert points out, this collabora-
tive attempt was not without conflict, since 
‘the corporation’s natural preference was to 
reinstate and widen the old street pattern, 
parcel the land into standard frontages, and 
sell them off to developers’ (Hebbert 1993: 
441), by 1959 the LCC had convinced the 
Corporation’s Common Council to enshrine 
the separation of pedestrians and vehicular 
traffic in policy, and the construction of high-
level walkways became a priority in City plan-
ning (Hebbert 1993: 441, 443).
The full extent of the City’s plans for the 
Pedway were kept secret until the mid-
1960s and not released publicly until 1976, 
at which point the scheme was under 
threat from conservationists.5 However, 
the plan was implemented wholeheartedly 
throughout this period, and openings and 
connections for the pedway network were 
incorporated within most commercial devel-
opments throughout the next decade. This 
was in part due to the fact that developers 
would be offered incentives for their inclu-
sion into schemes, usually in the way of plot 
ratio concessions, and were permitted to 
use the connection platforms for temporary 
offices, thus producing additional revenue.6 
The enthusiasm with which the network 
was implemented was justified by reasons 
of economy and efficiency in the financial 
centre. ‘Business activities carried out within 
the City [are] known to be based on a long 
tradition of personal contact’, claimed the 
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scientific ‘Walkways Study’, which sought to 
legitimise the scheme through further analy-
ses of ‘pedestrian and vehicular movement 
patterns, land use and activities, and physical 
development’ (City of London Department of 
Architecture and Planning 1978: 29). 
Viewed as an efficient alternative to, what 
City Architect Edwin Chandler described as, 
the City’s ‘utterly impracticable’ alleyways, 
the walkways were constructed in parallel to 
the designated traffic routes (Chandler 1975: 
91). Road widening, construction and large-
scale demolition took place throughout the 
City, attracting vociferous protest from con-
servationists, which, alongside the unfeasi-
ble cost of maintenance, would ultimately 
succeed in halting the pedway project. ‘It 
is a very dangerous thing to create a situa-
tion where you forget the prime function of 
the City and think of it in terms of a nice 
‘olde worlde’ tourist attraction,’ Chandler 
argued in his defence; ‘the fact remains 
that if you want something that is efficient 
as a great financial centre then it is almost 
impossible to carry it out on a major pres-
ervation basis’ (Chandler 1975: 91). Despite 
Chandler’s petition, in 1978 the scheme was 
reduced to a ‘Minimum Network’, compris-
ing existing sections that might have been 
made viable with the additions of links and 
bridges. However, by the time of the build-
ing boom of the 1980s, barely a fraction had 
been completed.
Dematerialisation and the 
deregulated City
The transition to the fast-paced Thatcherite 
City occurred slowly and somewhat awk-
wardly throughout the following decade. 
The gradual concession of the government 
to the markets saw a shift in political ide-
ology from the state allocation of funds 
to that of a market economy, position-
ing the paternalistic traditions of the City 
under scrutiny from neoliberal politicians. 
It was during this period that the Bank’s 
regulatory web began to fall apart, as more 
expanding City institutions made requests 
to move beyond the traditional banking dis-
trict to the north of the City, south of the 
river and, more worryingly, to the West End 
and Mayfair (Pryke 1991: 209–10). Further-
more, the absorption of computer technol-
ogy into most offices brought a shift in pace 
that was entirely incommensurate with the 
City’s face-to-face operations. 
Initially there was a general reluctance 
to abandon much of the old City’s ceremo-
nial conduct, with persistent participation 
in activities such as the visceral spectacle of 
messengers running to and from the Bank 
every Thursday to communicate the Bank 
Rate, notwithstanding a fully operational 
CCTV network (Economists Advisory Group 
1971: 295).7 Despite the increased automa-
tion of clearing systems and rise in telephone 
usage, the fact was that, even into the 1970s, 
many firms preferred to retain the human 
infrastructure of the traditional messenger-
operated clearing systems in order to retain 
the social structure and security that came 
with it. ‘One of the reasons people had con-
centrated in the Square Mile was so that they 
could be part of this system,’ stockbroker 
Nick Durlacher recalled; ‘messengers were 
an important part of all City businesses. [...] 
I have a feeling that [they] may have been 
more secure than the electronic technol-
ogy we have now which can be hacked into’ 
(Courtney and Thompson 1996: 205). 
Aside from the threat to the City’s value 
system, founded upon face-to-face meet-
ings and ritualistic displays of kinship, there 
were concerns surrounding the economic 
viability of electronic methods (Economists 
Advisory Group 1971: 296). The pace of the 
paper system, which had emerged due to 
the geographical organisation of the City, 
had become so ingrained into operations of 
the economy that faster technology initially 
seemed problematic. Despite the potential 
profitability of quicker settlement times with 
computer-run settlement systems, it was 
feared that ‘if any improvement is achieved 
in the speed of payments transmission [...] 
they will be faced with a loss of the interest 
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normally earned on money in the course of 
collection’, which for cheques could take up 
to three days (Nevin 1970: 209). Much in the 
way that the pedways had threatened the 
spatial practices of the club network through 
geographical distortion, the electronic pay-
ment systems threatened this system through 
temporal distortion (Pryke 1991: 203).
The question remained, how could an 
electronic programme reproduce the self-
regulatory club-like arrangement that had 
for so long protected the City’s independ-
ence? The first form of electronic trans-
fer system of payments, known as ‘BACS’ 
(Bankers Automated Clearing System), 
was developed between clearing banks in 
1968. However, it was not until 1972 that 
attempts were made to devise a system to 
accommodate the high-value, same-day set-
tlement in Town Clearing.8 One early proto-
type developed by the Interbank Research 
Organisation (IBRO), named SOVEREIGN, 
had been conceived to emulate the spatial 
form of town clearing, which, it argued, had 
been ‘developed to fit the requirements of 
their users, the convenience of their opera-
tors and the restrictions of their geography’ 
(Hailey and Wanley 1973). 
The hypothetical payment system was 
designed as an electronic version of the 
City’s club-like organisation: a member-run 
scheme that was centrally overseen by the 
Bank of England, mimicking the existing 
socio-geographical arrangement of the City 
as it currently stood. Those who wished to 
use the system were obligated to be ‘mem-
bers of a suitable club’, as the clubs provided 
‘services to their members by accepting and 
retransmitting their messages, by acting on 
the contents of the messages and by vouch-
ing for the good standing of their members’ 
(Hailey and Wanley 1973). The ‘clubs’ would 
be digital versions of existing institutions 
such as Lloyds and the Stock Exchange, act-
ing as informal modes of surveillance to 
ensure ‘the authenticity, credit worthiness, 
honesty and integrity’ of each ‘player’ in the 
payments game (Hailey and Wanley 1973). 
Although this plan was never executed, the 
official system CHAPS, which was imple-
mented in 1984, was initially conceived as a 
member-run scheme that would reproduce 
the existing geographical arrangement, pro-
viding settlement for offices within a one-
mile radius of the Bankers’ Clearing House 
in Lombard Street – the ‘CHAPS area’ (Hailey 
and Wanley 1973).
Within the following five years, the gentle-
manly practices in the City would be rapidly 
subsumed by an uncompromising deregu-
latory impulse underpinned by monetarist 
experimentation. The power cuts, three-day 
week, high unemployment and uncontrolla-
ble inflation that had plagued the Heath gov-
ernment in the middle of the decade were 
met by an IMF rescue operation in 1976, 
bearing the caveat of adopting monetarism 
as an economic model. Now the money sup-
ply, not the state allocation of funds, was the 
primary concern, and ‘the City, [being] in 
the business of moving and making money, 
was always likely to be more sympathetic to 
the notion that money matters in economic 
policy’ (Smith 1991: 81). The Bank embraced 
monetarism, adopting the ideas of Milton 
Friedman and the Chicago School even 
before the Treasury, and, as economic his-
torian David Smith argues, ‘in the 1980s, [it 
occasionally] appeared to act as the Treasury’s 
monetarist conscience’ (Smith 1991: 81).
The new scientific approaches to economic 
analysis ensured that an equally rational-
ised and methodical approach to regula-
tion and operation be adopted by the City 
Establishment. The closure of the Discount 
Office in 1976 ensured that the Bank’s mode 
of supervision as ‘a by-product of the mar-
ket intelligence fathering operations of its 
Discount Office’ was replaced by the creation 
of a specialist Supervision Division (Moran 
2003: 75). The secondary banking crisis of 
the 1970s had destroyed a number of smaller 
banks and threatened the elites, leading to 
the enforcement of the Banking Act 1979. 
The Act ensured that banking supervision 
became codified in law, that all regulatory 
bodies were to report to central government, 
and that the Bank of England’s role as a 
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regulator of the City was enshrined in statute 
(Moran 2003: 75). 
The dissolution of the Bank’s spatial and 
visual mode of regulation was exacerbated 
by the influx of international businesses. 
With the abolition of the post-war exchange 
controls in 1979 and the subsequent deregu-
lation of the stock market in the Big Bang of 
1986, the number of foreign banks in the 
City continued to increase, with require-
ments that exceeded capacity of the dark, 
cramped, and often listed Victorian and 
Edwardian properties in the Square Mile. 
The need for large floor-plates and cavities to 
support the wiring and cooling of computers, 
and increased volumes of unrestricted trade, 
led to a loosening of planning restrictions 
that would allow businesses to move beyond 
the historic core to accommodate larger 
architectural footprints. By the 1980s, the 
impact of financial deregulation had spread 
to the geographical arrangement of the City: 
a host of new developments emerged at the 
peripheries to attract and accommodate big-
ger international corporations, forming new 
financial villages based on American proto-
types more suited to the needs of its transat-
lantic tenants. 
The dispersal of offices, in tandem with 
the increases in volume and scale of finan-
cial transactions, were the dominant impe-
tus for the implementation of the CHAPS 
system in 1984. However, it wasn’t until 
1995 that Town Clearing officially ended 
and the final ‘dematerialisation of money 
market instruments’ finally took place (Bank 
of England n.d.). The pedestrian system per-
sisted alongside CHAPS for several years, 
partly out of habit, partly due to the belief 
that the efficiency of the old system would 
render the economic benefits of automa-
tion too insignificant to bother (Clark 1984: 
36–7). It was the perceived risk of human 
error in the old system that finally put an 
end to the employment of messengers for 
clearing and settlement in the City. In May 
1990, a financial messenger was robbed 
at knifepoint of £292m worth of bonds 
he was delivering in a City side street, at 
which point the Bank of England switched 
its Central Moneymarket Operations office 
to a digital system entitled CREST (Bank of 
England n.d.; Dennis 2002). 
In the aftermath of the Big Bang, the City’s 
planning policies became more focused on 
the provision of space than the facilitation of 
movement. Despite protests from conserva-
tion groups, by 1986 the City’s Local Plan was 
redrafted to allow for the demolition of once 
“listed” historic buildings to expand its floor 
space by 25% (King 1990: 91, 98). The upper 
level policies of the 1970s, centred around 
the pedways, were almost entirely aban-
doned in favour of policy that catered for 
the construction of enormous developments 
using the Corporation’s newly acquired ‘air-
rights’ to span roads and railway tracks. With 
technological innovations increasing trans-
action speeds, and the replacement of the 
old City’s gentlemanly codes of conduct with 
a new international variant of business eti-
quette, the streets and alleys were stripped 
of their functional purpose and given a new 
sartorial role as the backdrop to the theatre 
of haut finance.
This new role was taken seriously by the 
Corporation. The impact of the conserva-
tion lobby a decade earlier had ensured 
that, despite its more pragmatic impulses 
regarding property development and demo-
lition, the historic face of the City’s streets 
and courtyards had become a key part of 
the City’s branding strategy as an interna-
tional financial centre. By the time of the 
publication of the Draft Local Plan in 1984, 
pedestrian movement had been removed lin-
guistically from the realms of business effi-
ciency and repositioned within two additions 
to the City’s planning lexicon: ‘townscape’ 
and ‘environmental quality’ (City of London 
Department of Architecture and Planning 
1984: 139–174). 
Introduced for the first time in 1979, the 
term ‘environmental quality’ was defined as 
the ‘degree of pleasure or displeasure experi-
enced in living and working in, and in mov-
ing about, the City of London’. ‘While the 
design of individual buildings is important’, 
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the 1979 ‘Background Study’ claimed, ‘so is 
the treatment of the spaces between and 
the settings within which they are seen’ 
(City of London Department of Architecture 
and Planning 1979: 11; 43). Far removed 
from the statistical emphasis in the pedes-
trian and meeting surveys just one decade 
earlier, here the City’s ‘distinctive urban 
form and “grain”’, ‘close-knit building pat-
tern’ and ‘strong general sense of enclosure’ 
would now provide spaces of entertainment 
between office hours, as opposed to func-
tional appendages to the workplace (City 
of London Department of Architecture and 
Planning 1984: 146). By the beginning of 
the 1990s, the conservationist attitude had 
been wholly subsumed within the City’s 
broader business strategy to reinstate itself 
as the world’s leading financial centre.9 
Throughout the decade, a number of alleys, 
such as Pope’s Head Alley and Ship Passage, 
were realigned or reinstated on account of 
the fact that ‘the relatively short walking 
distances between firms, institutions and 
other services located in the City is seen to 
form a unique and valued feature of the 
City’s business environment’ (City of London 
Department of Planning 1995: 81). 
Conclusion
By the end of the twentieth century, the role 
of the street in the City had been radically 
reconfigured. The terrorist bombings of the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army in 1992 
and 1993 demanded a re-writing of the City’s 
approach to security, public space and pedes-
trian access. Checkpoints positioned at the 
entrances to the Square Mile stemmed the 
flow of traffic, indirectly placing the focus 
on pedestrian activity once more, yet the 
introduction of over 1,000 private surveil-
lance cameras by 1996 ensured that this 
activity was to be heavily monitored (Coaffee 
2009: 115). Simultaneously, the discussion 
of streets in planning terms had shifted away 
from connotations of economic pedestrian 
efficiency, towards a conception of the street 
as public space designed to facilitate the 
social accoutrements of the financial services 
industry. In other words, the street moved 
from being an extension of the office, to a 
place devoted to leisure.
This paper has attempted to reveal the his-
torical relationship between the street and 
economic activity in the City as a reciprocal 
process. Prior to automation, the fine mesh 
of smaller streets was both the product of 
mercantile and financial activity, and the cat-
alyst behind the geographical arrangement 
of the clearing system. In regulatory terms, 
the streets assisted a form of natural surveil-
lance via a kinetic fraternity of messengers, 
whilst the movement of the discount brokers 
between institutions permitted the Bank to 
act, oversee and, if necessary, intervene in the 
money markets. Throughout the process of 
automation in the 1960s and 1970s, the con-
flict between the speed of interpersonal and 
electronic modes of exchange meant that the 
street became the subject of experimentation 
for economic gain. In planning terms, the 
Corporation looked for efficiency via whole-
sale reconstruction of the pedestrian net-
work above ground; whilst simultaneously 
at ground level, attempts at centralisation 
and new inventions in the clearing systems 
were implemented to mechanise the existing 
spatial process. This temporal incongruence 
between pedestrian pace and digital technol-
ogy grew with the development of digital 
technology. The latter was revealed in proto-
types for the automated clearing systems in 
the 1970s, in which the club-like social and 
spatial arrangement of the City was used as 
a basis for the organisational structure of the 
new, digital systems. 
The gradual disintegration of the overt 
economic function of the City’s streets has 
come about with the growing abstraction of 
financial instruments and increased mobility 
of the labour market. However, that is not 
to say that the role of the street has dimin-
ished, but has taken on a different meaning; 
the City’s historic streetscape now forms the 
setting for out-of-hours entertainment for 
workers, and simultaneously behaves as a 
branding mechanism to attract new workers 
and businesses to the City. Today the physical 
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limitations of finance persist; geographical 
proximity of institutions can have micro-
second advantages in the context of high 
frequency trading, causing many firms to 
‘cluster’ in the same area (Mollan and Michie 
2012: 36).10 As Simon Mollan and Ranald 
Michie have argued, ‘there has been no “end 
of geography” or “death of distance” because 
time is relative when dealing in financial 
products where margins depend on fractions 
of a second when orders are placed’ (Mollan 
and Michie 2012: 38–39). Simultaneously, 
the face-to-face business ‘meeting’ continues 
to take place, despite improvements in tech-
nology, rendering the City just as important 
as a place as it is a financial centre. 
The emphasis on the mobility, invisibility 
and flexibility of the current global finan-
cial arrangement only serves to reinforce its 
impermeability to those outside the system. 
Aesthetically, such assumptions ignore per-
haps the biggest environmental paradox of 
financial capitalism: as the mechanisms of 
exchange become increasingly invisible, the 
environment that supports such processes, 
i.e. the financial center, is made increasingly 
visible. This paper has attempted to show that 
financial activities are reliant on the relation-
ships between individuals, places and spaces 
and thus cannot be written off as abstract 
automaton, when the financial transaction is 
in fact a process that underpins the basis of 
society. As Simmel so eloquently wrote, over 
a century before us:
It is [...] almost a tautology to say that 
exchange brings about socialization: for 
exchange is a form of socialization. It is one 
of those relations through which a number 
of individuals become a social group, and 
‘society’ is identical with the sum of these 
relations (Simmel 1990, p. 175).
Notes
 1 There was a subset of Town Clearing that 
dealt with settlements for non-clearing 
banks and businesses located outside of 
the Town Clearing Area known as ‘Walks 
Clearing’. The latter were carried out by 
special messengers using carts. 
 2 The 1947 plan accommodated for a 
future daytime population of 427,000 
(which was far higher than ever realised), 
over 82 million sq. ft, dispersed across a 
smaller area of land than that used by the 
City in the pre-war period (Economists 
Advisory Group 1971: 46).
 3 For example, in May 1968 the Bank of 
England allowed the discount houses to 
deal as principles in bills of exchange in 
foreign currencies, and just two years 
later, the members of the Union Discount 
Company were carrying walkie-talkies on 
their daily visits (Kynaston 2000: 504).
 4 These were titled the ‘Business Contacts 
Survey’ (1967) and ‘Pedestrian Movement 
Survey’ (1969). See, respectively: Econo-
mists Advisory Group (1971): 161–168; 
and City of London Department of Archi-
tecture and Planning (1978): 21–24.
 5 See 1976 Pedway map in City of London 
Department of Architecture and Plan-
ning (1978).
 6 Doubts about the Corporation’s ability to 
enforce such planning conditions in the 
more official capacity of planning permis-
sions led to the passing City of London 
Various Powers Act (1967), which effec-
tively stated that Walkway provisions 
were compulsory for new schemes fall-
ing within the network, but that mainte-
nance would be provided for by the Cor-
poration (Great Britain, 1967).
 7 The report quips, ‘like the traditional 
top hat, [it] is little more than a gesture. 
Firms admit (a little shamefacedly) that 
they get the news quicker by closed-
circuit television’ (Economists Advisory 
Group, 1971).
 8 Clearing banks became known as retail 
banks in 1973. Non-clearing banks were 
able to use the system but only through 
using a clearing bank as an intermediary 
(Batiz-Lazo and Wood 2002: 11).
 9 For more on the City’s self-conscious 
planning policies, see Kaika, 2010.
 10 City trading desk transactions with the 
London Stock Exchange servers located 
in the City was achieved in 0.1μs, while 
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connection to the NYSE Euronext site 
in Basildon took 0.43μs, and connec-
tion with the Chi X server in Slough took 
0.47μs. These time advantages, however 
small, are important.
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